Warsh said the Board’s staff “has begun to evaluate various contingencies, applying stylized, model-based frameworks to generate scenarios,” and stressed they are “illustrative scenarios, not forecasts” [1]. He described three:
- Broad gains. AI raises productivity, the gains are “shared broadly across labor and the owners of capital,” real GDP growth “rises persistently above its long-run average, and the U.S. stays close to full employment” [1].
- Growth with job losses. GDP growth still rises above its long-term average, but “widespread automation, combined with labor market frictions, could push the jobless rate above levels consistent with full employment” [1].
- Disappointment. “After significant capital investment and stock market gains, expected returns could turn down and equity valuations could fall, leading to an economic slowdown and a more notable rise in unemployment. In time, the economy would recover, but without the productivity gains” [1].
Warsh said many other outcomes could be drawn, “probably including one that will prove most accurate” [1]. He framed the big questions as magnitude, scope and timing: whether AI will lift total factor productivity, when a surge would start and taper, whether it happens faster in the US than elsewhere, and whether adversaries will “race to deploy SI, intending to do harm to our economy” [1]. He also said “SI empowers all, including bad actors,” and that the Fed is thinking especially about critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities [1].