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The UK is committing hundreds of billions of pounds to defence. Ministers insist the money will be good, not just for national security, but also for the wider economy. More military spending, they argue, means investment, factories and jobs.
It is an appealing promise and, for a Government struggling to revive growth while public services remain stretched, one based on real hope.
But what happens if the technologies developed with this investment eventually end up harming civilian jobs? What if artificial intelligence designed for warfare transmutes into becoming a tool for reducing staffing numbers in hospitals, banks and factories?
The defence dividend might – in the long term – prove less generous than advertised.
Just ask Siri.
Apple’s voice assistant traces part of its origin story to the Pentagon’s Personal Assistant that Learns (PAL) programme. Its CALO project, developed by SRI International, helped give rise to the ubiquitous commercial assistant that Apple acquired in 2010. Admittedly, this is more evidence of technological transfer, not job destruction. But it does show that military-funded software can spill from their casement and penetrate the civilian world in profound and transformative ways.
Despite this, the mantra that investment into military tech will benefit us all persists. Britain’s 2026 Defence Investment Plan envisages £298bn of expenditure over four years. Within that budget, nearly £20bn is allocated to digital infrastructure, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, technological innovation and AI-related programmes.
Ministers herald nearly 60,000 extra direct and indirect jobs by the decade’s end. And Dan Jarvis, former Secretary of State for Defence, has promised “sovereign technologies the UK needs for the future: AI, autonomy, and quantum.”
Yet the employment dividend from such AI and autonomy technologies deserve deeper scrutiny. Jobs generated in defence procurement might be easily visible in defence but those jobs displaced if such tech spreads elsewhere may be much harder to count.
Professor Elke Schwarz, a political theorist at Queen Mary University of London, challenges the MOD’s premise. “This claim that more spending in defence will grow the economy is absolutely contestable and there’s no conclusive evidence in the first place,” she says.
Military spending can divert resources from infrastructure and other investments that might create more employment and prosperity. The relevant comparison has to be not defence spending against nothing, but defence spending against alternative uses of public money.
The economic case for military spending draws partly on Keynesian arguments about the ability of public expenditure to stimulate demand and employment. In his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), John Maynard Keynes observed that even wars “may serve to increase wealth” when demand was insufficient. In his 1933 letter to President Franklin D Roosevelt, he encouraged the president to employ “in the interests of peace and prosperity, the technique which hitherto has only been allowed to serve the purposes of war and destruction.”
Military Keynesianism has political advantages. Defence is particularly attractive politically. As the Polish economist Michał Kalecki said in 1943, “the dislike of Government spending, whether on public investment or consumption, is overcome by concentrating Government expenditure on armaments.” Today, critics of rising defence budgets risk being told they are making a mockery of Britain, that they are acting in a Chamberlainian manner of appeasement or that they are, simply, unpatriotic.
Such inflamed rhetoric can make Parliamentarians wary of asking critical questions about claimed economic returns.
There is also a crucial technological difference between the military-economic world Keynes contemplated and the one we see today. Twentieth-century military investment produced ships, aircraft and ammunition, employing substantial industrial workforces. Increasingly, public money now supports AI, autonomous systems and software designed to accomplish tasks with fewer people.
And, unlike a submarine, such software can be readily adapted for civilian customers.
Britain already provides examples. Defence funding helped the British company Advai develop methods of testing and challenging AI systems that have been later applied to commercial AI applications such as “verification and benchmarking”. DIEM Analytics developed AI interview technology for military personnel that has since been applied in construction, pharmaceuticals and venture capital. Whilst Zelim’s AI-assisted detection technology, supported through defence innovation funding, has seeped into commercial shipping.
To be clear – there is, as yet, no tangible proof such seepage has caused net job losses. Zelim, for instance, expanded its workforce from ten to 28. But the commercial promise of AI is, all too often, to reduce demand for labour.
Palantir is the most salient case in point. Initially backed by the CIA’s venture-capital arm, the controversial American company supplies military intelligence technology as well as software to civilian organisations. Britain’s Ministry of Defence awarded Palantir a £240.6m analytics and support contract covering 2026 to 2029 without competition. But this is a company that boasts about how it can cut your labour demands.
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Palantir claims, for instance, its work with Citi Wealth reduced the people required for an account-opening process from 50 to one. The Metropolitan Police planned to use Palantir’s AI software to automate intelligence analysis and other administrative tasks, enabling the force to automate the impact of cuts of around 500 posts. The proposed £50m contract was blocked in May 2026 over procurement concerns, although the subsequent legal dispute was settled in October.
Professor Schwarz also points to Palantir’s Warp Speed AI-powered manufacturing automation platform, used by British defence company Babcock.
“It is these technologies that are likely to not produce more jobs,” she says.
Who is measuring that effect? A House of Lords report, published on Wednesday, fails to properly scrutinise the economic promise of the defence dividend. Entitled Ready for action in 1,000 days?, it argues that greater investment certainty for defence companies would “create employment and economic growth”. Yet it then acknowledges that defence firms could draw workers away from other industries with no corresponding assessment of whether the wider economy would gain or lose jobs.
Even the Government’s own Skills England assessment casts doubt on the scale of the promised defence dividend. Its central forecast anticipates demand for 52,700 additional workers in priority defence occupations by 2035. Under alternative economic assumptions, that figure falls to just 7,900. Neither estimate incorporates the effects of AI adoption, which the report acknowledges could boost productivity while reducing demand for labour. Indeed, it concedes that employment projections for occupations vulnerable to AI-driven automation may already be overstated.
It is not just the UK. Across advanced economies, the IMF estimates that around 60% of jobs are exposed to AI. Some workers will benefit from productivity gains; others may face reduced demand for their labour. And if this happens, there may be political consequences. Researchers studying 14 western European countries between 1993 and 2016 found that greater exposure to industrial robots increased support for nationalist and radical-right parties.
The ultimate question is whether Britain’s defence-led industrial strategy could create jobs in the military sector while also exporting technologies that displace workers elsewhere, leaving the wider economy worse off than if the money had been invested differently.
Ministers have yet to demonstrate that they have adequately assessed this risk. Until they do, claims of a defence economic dividend should be treated with caution.
